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A TEST  OF  CONSUMPTION  INSURANCE 
ABSTRACT 
Are  individuals  effectively  insured  against  idiosyncratic  shocks  to 
income  or wealth  by either  formal or informal mechanisms?  This paper  shows 
that under perfect  insursnce,  marginal  utility  should  grow at the same  rate 
for all  consumers,  and  that  the distribution  of measured  consumption  growth 
rates  should  be independent of  variables  that are exogenous  to the individual 
consumer when we allow for measurement  error  in consumption  and for vsristion 
in  preferences.  This  proposition  is tested by cross  sectional  regressions  of 
individual  consumption  growth  on s variety  of variables  that  should  not be 
correlated  with it under perfect  insurance)  including  illness,  being  fired 
from s job,  etc. 
John  H. Cochrane 
Oepartment  of  Economics 
University  of  Chicago 
1126 E.  59th Street 
Chicago,  IL  60637 L  Introduction 
If  markets  were  complete  and  perfect,  or  if  there  was  some other 
institution  or mechanism  that  implemented  a full  information  pareto  optimal 
consumption  allocation,  then  individuals'  consumption  would vary only with 
aggregate  consumption  and would not respond  to idiosyncratic  variations  in 
income  or  wealth.  This proposition  can  be viewed as  a  cross  aectional 
counterpart  to  the  permanent  income  hypothesis:  perfect  insurance  implies 
that consumption  growth  should not  vary across  individuals  in response  to 
idiosyncratic  shocks,  just  as  perfect  asset  markets  imply  that  an 
individual's  consumption  should  not  vary over time in response  to temporary 
shocks  in income. 
At face value  this  is a ludicrous  proposition:  the consumption  of state 
lottery  winners  certainly  rises,  even when aggregate  consumption  declines. 
However,  it is not  so obvious  that the proposition  is ludicrous  for shocks 
that  are  important  to macroeconornists: when an consumer  loses his  job,  gets 
sick,  works  in an industry  that  suffers  a  loss  in demand,  etc.,  does  that 
consumer  suffer  a loss of  wealth,  revealed in  his consumption  choice?  Or  are 
such  shocks effectively  insured,  either  by  formal  instituti.ons  such  as 
unemployment  and  disability  insurance,  or  by  the  network  of  informa]. 
institutions  that can  proxy  for insurance,  including  gifts  and  "loans"  from 
relatives,  friends  and  neighbors,  "labor  hoarding"  or  other  implicit 
insurance  on the part  of employers,  local or  national  charities,  etc.? 
1 Beyond direct interest  in this  question,  the  presente  or strength  of 
consumption  insursnce  has further implications  in a number  or contexts.  As a 
first  example,  perfect  insurance  implies  the existence  of  s  representative 
consumer,  i.e.  a social  welfsre  function  that  is independent  of changes  in 
the distribution  of  income or wealth  (but not,  in general,  independent of the 
individual  Pareto  weights).  Without perfect insurance,  the existence of such 
a representative  consumer  depends  on specific  functional  foras  for utility 
and  technology,  for  example  quadratic  utility  and  linear  technology  (see 
Hansen (1986)).  As a  result,  the  presumed  lack of  perfect  conaumption 
insurance  in the real world is often  cited  as an explanation  for  empirical 
failures  of representative  consumer  models,  and as  motivation  for studying 
macroeconomic  and financial  theories without  perfect insurance  and  hence with 
"missing  markets"  and  a dependence  on the  ex post distribution  of wealth. 
(Conatantinedes  (1988)  gives  a  good  review  of  recent  research in  this 
direction.)  By  testing  for  consumption  insurance,  we  can  test  the 
presumption  behind  this explanation  and motivation. 
As a second example,  the  need for  explicit  treatment  of  private 
information  in  macroeconomics  is  similarly  ascribed  to a lack of consumption 
insurance  due  to  that  private  information.  In many private  information 
setups, the Pareto  optimal  consumption  allocation  less than  perfectly  insures 
individuals  against  risk,  as a result  of moral  hazard.  A test  for perfect 
consumption  insurance  is a teat of this implication,  and hence  a teat  for the 
empirical  relevance  of  private  information  theory  for  macroeconomics. 
Conversely,  in many circumstances  it is attractive  to apply the results of a full  information  Pareto  planning exercise  directly  to  an  actual  economy 
without worrying about  the  mechanism  or market  or other  institutions  that 
implement  it (see Townsend  (1987)); a test for consumption  insurance  can give 
us some evidence whether  this approach is a good  idea for our economy. 
The basic  idea of the tests  for consumption  insurance  in this paper  is 
that  since  individual  consumption  growth should only depend on  aggregate 
consumption  growth, then  should  equal zero in  a regression  like 
Ac —o+$X 
+  (I) 
where ac 
— a  measure  of household  j's nondurable  consumption  growth, and X. 
is  some shock variable  that  is exogenous  to  the  consumer (not  a decision 
variable),  for  example  days  of work  lost  due  to  illness.  By  running 
regressions  like  (1)  we not only test the theory  (which, as mentioned  above, 
is ludicrous  if take too literally)  ,  but we can find out for which  shocks  and 
among  which groups of consumers  the  theory  does hold,  snd for which  it does 
not. 
In a  perfectly  measured economy  of  identical  consumers  with constant 
relative  risk aversion,  there  should  be no error  term  in a regression  (1) 
under  perfect  insurance:  each  individual's  consumption  growth would  be 
exactly  equal  to  all  the  others  and  to  aggregate  consumption  growth. 
However,  we can expect an error  term  when applying  (1) to our  economy.  The 
theory of perfect insurance  states  that  the growth in marginal utility  of 
consumption  should be the  same  for  all  consumers,  but measured consumption 
growth  can vary across  individuals  if the  consumers'  utility  functions  have 
3 different  shapes,  undergo  ahifrs,  or if consumption  growth  is measured  with 
error.  In particular,  I will take a household  as the basic  unit of  analysis 
rather than  try  to  construct  an  age-standardized  per  capita  consumption 
measure,  so  changes  in the composition  of the household  - -  having  a baby or 
a  child  leaving  --  are  an obvious  source  of preference  shocks,  as are  the 
aging  of  existing  household  members,  or  shocks  to  the  preferences  of 
individuals  in the household. 
Since  the error  term is compoaed  of measurement  error  and variation  in 
preferences,  it  is  important  to pick right  hand side  variables  that are 
plausibly  uncorrelated  with the  measurement  error  in consumption,  that  are 
well  measured  themselves,  and  that  are  uncorrelated  with  variation in 
preferences  across individuals  and  with preference  shocks.  For  example, 
quitting  s  job  might  be  correlated  with  other  events  that  reduce  an 
individual's  desired  level  (marginal  utility)  of consumption,  end  so would 
not be an appropriate  right  hand vsrisble;  being  fired  from a job  is more 
plausibly uncorrelated  with  such  events.  Hence,  the  best  right  hand 
variables  in an equation  like  (1) are  vsrisbles  that  are  exogenous  to the 
household,  and not decision  vsriables  of the household. 
In psrticulsr,  I  will not  emphasize  income  as  s  right  hand variable. 
Though  regarding  income  as exogenous  to the individual has a long and honored 
tradition,  households  that undergo  a preference  shock  (say, having  a baby,  or 
having  a child  leave) have an incentive  to work more  or less  to incresse  or 
decrease  income.  This is especially  important  if  the shock  is unexpected,  or 
4 if well functioning  insurance  markets  are accompanied  by poorly functioning 
markets for  borrowing  and lending.  Hence,  income  is  quite  likely  to  be 
correlated  with  preference  shocks. 
The observation  that  individual's  consumption should  vary together under 
perfect  insurance,  and the attempt to verify  this assertion  are of  course  not 
new.  As a  few  examples,  Scheinkmann  and Weiss  (1986) look at variation  in 
consumption  across  countries,  Abel and Kotlikoff  (1988)  look at consumption 
within s  dynastic  family,  in  which case  altruistic  preferences  are  the 
mechanism  for perfect  insurance,  and Mace  (1988) focuses on the use of income 
as  a  right  hand variable,  using  a  variety  of  techniques  to mitigate its 
potencial  correlation  with the error  term. 
2.  Testable  Implications  of  Consumption  Insurance 
This  section  presents  two results.  First,  under  perfect  insurance,  the 
marginal  utility  of  consumption  should  grow at  the  same  rate  for  all 
individuals.  Second,  consumption  growth  rates  ought  to be  independent  of 
variables  that are external  to the consumer,  and hence  uncorrelaced  with the 
consumer's  type,  preference  shocks,  and  measurement  error  in  consumption. 
This last  proposition  is the basis  of  the tests that follow. 
I will characterize  the behavior  of consumption  under perfect  markets by 
examining  the  Pareto  problem  rather  than  explicitly  constructing  an 
5 equilibrium  or  other  implementation  mechanism.  The Pareto problem  is 
max  S  ($i)t u(c) 
j  t 
(j  indexes consumers  and t indexes time) subject to a feasibility  constraint. 
The period utility  function uJ(c3)  may include  preference  shocks.  Other 
goods,  and leisure  in particular,  may enter  separably  (this  is  generalized 
below)  The feasibility  constrsint  is 
cA ￿  TA  t  t 
where c 
— E.c, 
and  TA is  the  aggregate  amount  of  the  consumption  good 
available  at time t.  (A  indicates  aggregate quantities). 
In  an  endowment  economy,  the  total  endowment  is  available  for 
distribution, 
A  A  e 
where  eA — .e3  and e3 are endowment  streams  (labor  income)  .  With  a linear 
capital accumulation  technology,  we  have instead 
TA_RKA+eA KA1  (5) 
where K  denotes  the capital  stock  or  nonhuman wealth  at time t.  The form of 
the intertemporal  transformation  of  consumption will drop from the analysis, 
so more complicated  production  technologies will give  the same  results.  The 
important  assumption  is that conaumption  can be coatlessly  reallocated  across 
individuals,  embodied  in (3). 
The first order  conditions  for the Pareto problem max (2) subject  to  (3) 
6 and (4)  or (5)  include an intertemporal condition  for each individual, 
u'(c) - E(R u3'(c+i)) 
(6) 
where  R is  either the physical  rate of return  in (5)  or the  shadow  price 
associated  with () and  a cross sectional conditton, 
)) u(c) - Ak  uk,(C1o)  .  (7) 
The  intertemporal  conditicn  (6)  is  the  basis  of  the  permanent  income 
hypothesis;  this  paper  studies  the  cross  sectional  condition  (7). Note  that 
(6)  and (7) may hold independently  of each other.  A group  of  agents may be 
perfectly  insured,  but  the shadow  price  R in (6)  may not correspond  to the 
relevant  marginal  product;  conversely, they  may be able  to borrow  and lend  or 
to invest in backyard  technologies,  and not be perfectly  insured. 
To derive  an  empirically useful  relation,  use (7) at two different  dates 
to eliminate  the A weights: 
jj  k  k 
u  (c  )  u  (c  )  t+r  t+r  jj  k  k 
u  (c)  u  (ct) 
or marginal  utility  nust  grow at the same rate  for all individuals. 
Note  this  is  a  distinct  proposition  than  that  which  results  form 
dividing  the  intertenporal  condition  (6)  for two  individuals:  (8)  holds  ex 
post,  not  just  in  expected values,  and,  since  (8)  does  not  use  the 
intertemporal  conditions  at all,  it  holds  no matter what the  technology  for 
intertemporal  transformation.  The  essential  trick  used in deriving  (8)  is 
7 that the  A weighta  at two  time  perioda cancel,  because  we are  watching  the 
evolution  over time of one economy. 
The equality  of marginal  utility growth  does not  imply  that  consumption 
growth  rates  should  be  equal,  unless  consumers  have  identical  CRRA 
preferences  and  consumption  is  perfectly  measured.  To  derive  a  testable 
implication,  I'll  first  display  a  parametric  example  that makes  the logic 
clear, and then  pteaent  the general statement.  Assume that  utility  functions 
display  constant  relative risk  aversion with  a  multiplicative  shock S, and a 
risk  aversion  coefficient  y that is common across  consuznera. 
1 
u3'(c)  S 
l+y 
Then,  the condition  (8) that marginal utility grows  at the same rate  is 
S  (c3  )7  5k  (ck  )1  t+r  t+r  —  t+r  t+r 
S  (c)  S  (cJ 
or 
+ y log (c/c) 
— 
Vt+r 
+  log (c/c) 
where 
'3+r 
— log(S/5).  Denote  the common value  of (11) aa m7.  Then, we 
can rewrite  (11) as 
log (c/c) 
— a  - 
Finally,  allow a mean zero error  in  measuring  consumption  growth, ao 
8 1og(c/c) 
—  -  (  +  )  (13) 
Consider a variable X  that is independent  of preference  shifts  and 
measurement error  e.  (13)  implies  that  and  consumption  growth 
log(c÷/c) 
are  independent  of each other;  or consumption  growth  rates  are 
distributed  independently  of X. 
As  a  test  of  this  proposition,  I  will run regressions  of  the  form 
log(c4/c) 
— a  + fiX  +  j  1,2,..  .n  (14) 
So long  as the measurement  error  in  consumption  growth and preference  shocks 
are  mean  zero,  hornoskedastic,  uncorrelated  across  individuals,  and 
uncorrelated  with the variables X  ,  we  can  use  OLS  estimates  and  conventional 
t  or F tests to test whether 5 — 
The  statement  that measured  consumption  growth  ought  to be independent 
of an  external  variable X3 holds with  more general utility  functions.  Assuce 
that  u1(.)  is  monotone,  concave  and  differentiable,  but  may  vary across 
individuals,  Let  be a type index of individual  utility  functions,  and let 
represent  a (not necessarily  multiplicative)  preference  shock  as above 
(93  indexes  utility  functions  at time  t,  indexes  utility  functions  at 
time t+r.)  I will use the following notation  for marginal utility  growth: 
u(c 
f(c3  /c3  c 9 )  t+r  (15) 
t+i-  t  t  t+1•  3  3  u  (c) 
(f is written  this way because  marginal utility  growth  depends on c+r 
and and  not  just  on  the  growth rate  t+/c, without power  utility.)  The 
properties  of  the  function  f are  unessential;  what matters  is  the  list  of 
variables  that make measured  consumption  growth rates  vary across  individuals 
while marginal  utility  growth  is constant. 
With the  measurement  error  in consumption  growth,  the  equality  of 
marginal  utility  growth  (8)  implies that 
f(t3  /c 
-  c3  O v  )  (16)  t#r  t  t+t  t  t+r 
should  be constant  across  consumers,  so if  is  independent  of measurement 
error e,  initisl  consumption  c, types  B, and preference  shocks 
measured  consumption  growth  should  be independent  of  .  The  effect of the 
CRRA assumptions  in  the example  above wss to remove c  and  from the list 
of  variables  that affect marginal  utility growth given  consumption  growth} 
If leisure  (or another  good)  enters  the utility  function  nonseparably, 
then  leisure affects  the marginal  utility  of consumption,  and this  drives  a 
further  wedge  between  marginal  utility  growth  and  consumption  growth. 
However,  leisure  must enter in a way that  is nonseparable  under arbitrary 
monotone  tranaformations,  not  just  linear  transformations,  as  only  the 
ordinal  properties  of  the  utility  functions,  or  marginal  rates  of 
substitution,  enter into the derivation  of the equality  of marginal  utility 
growth,  ($)2  For  example Cobb-Douglss  preferences  c&LTC  are  separable 
after  a log transformation.  With  nonsepsrsbilities  that  cannot  be removed by 
a monotonic  transformation,  the  prediction  that  consumption  growth rates 
should  be  independent  of  will  still  hold,  if  X3  is  distributed 
10 independently  of  leisure. 
Under  perfect  insurance,  we  predict  that  coefficients  as  in  (14) 
should  equal  zero.  If we find  a nonzero coefficient,  it is tempting  to cast 
this  not  just  as  a  statistical  rejection  of  the  theory,  but  also  as  a 
measurement  of  the  rule  for  the  allocation  of consumption  conditional  on 
outcomes X  The caveat  to this interpretation  is that if there are several 
variables  that  are  not  perfectly  insured,  say  X and  ,  and  if  these 
variables  are  correlated,  then  a  single  regression  coefficient  as  in  (14) 
will  not be the same as the true allocation  rule, which  would be revealed  by 
the multiple  regression  coefficient of consumption growth  on both  X3 and 
3.  Results 
I used  data from the Panel Study  of Income Dynamics  for the years  1981 - 
1984.  Table  1 presents  a description  of the variables.  I  used two measures 
of  consumption  growth.  In the  first,  I rejected households  that  had any 
change  in composition,  because  composition  changes  ought  to imply a shift  in 
the household's  utility function.  The second measure  of  consumption  does not 
screen  out  these  households.  Utility  shifts  induced  by family  composition 
changes  contribute  to the error  term in (14);  since  the right hand  variables 
are chosen  to be uncorrelated  with those  shifts, the  inclusion  of  households 
that  change  composition  does  not  bias  coefficient  estimates,  but  will 
influence  standard errors.  Including  households  with a change  in composition 
11 raises  the  variance  of  the  error  term,  but  incresses  the  number of 
observations. 
The right hand  variables  include illness,  strikes, being forced  to move, 
involuntary  job  loss,  and weeks  looking  for  unemployment.  I  also  used 
hot: hold composition  change  as a right hand variable  as a test whether  the 
technique  can  pick up a  coefficient  we know  should  be  positive,  and  I 
included  the obvious  regression  on  growth  in total family  income. 
Table 2  presents  the  results.  For each right  hand variable and each 
consumption  measure  it  presents  an  OLS regression,  an OLS regression  using a 
dummy right  hand variable,  and  a  test  for  independence  of  the  events 
(consumption  growth > 0)  and (right hand variable  >  0). The  01.5  regression 
using  dummy  variables  amounts  to an estimate  and  test of the  difference  in 
sample  means between  the group with  >  0  and  — 0. 
The  illness  variable  (panel  II)  is  statistically  significant  in  the 
regressions.  The value  of the parameter  is quite  small--each  day of illness 
is associated  with a  .048 percentage  point  decline  in  consumption growth  from 
80 to  83.  However,  the relationship  seems to be nonlinesr,  and the rejection 
due to households  with lots of illness: households  with  more than  100 days of 
illness  have  consumption  11.2  -  14.2  percentage  points  lower  than other 
families,  more  than  the  4.8-5.6%  suggested  by  multiplying  the  OLS 
coefficients  by 100.  Furthermore,  the regression  using  a dummy for illness > 
0  was insignificant,  as is the  test for independence  of (consume > 0) and 
12 (illness > 0). 
The  lostjob variable (panel  III) has  the largest  and  most  significant 
coefficient.  Households  with lostjob  — I had consumption  growth  24  -  26 
percentage  points  lower  than households  with lostjob — 0,  which is about  half 
of  the  standard deviation  of  reported  consumption  growth  rates.  The 
t-atstistics  and p value for  clearly reject  independence.  Fig. 1 presents 
a histogram  of the conditional  distributions  of consumption  given lostjob — C 
and 1, and the difference  in  conditional  distribution  is  clearly visible. 
The wkslook variable  (panel IV) is an attempt to find a continuous  scale 
over  which the effects  of  losrjob  can be seen.  However,  the coefficients  on 
wkslook  are  small  and  insignificant.  The  major  reason is  that  most 
households with lostjob  —  1  did  not  report  any  weeks  spent  looking  for 
employment.  The  strike  variable  (panel  V)  is  another  plausible  external 
shock  to  labor  income,  but  it  too  produced  small  and  insignificant 
coefficients. 
The  move  variable  (panel  VI)  is  another  possible  indicator  of  an 
external  shock  to hit the household.  The coefficients  are large,  but on the 
borders  of  significance,  and one is of the wrong  sign. 
The  regression  of consumption  growth  on income  (panel  VTI)  yielded  a 
positive  and significant  coefficient  of s  surprisingly  low  magnitude.  A 
model  with liquidity  conatraints  and no insurance would predict  a coefficient 
13 of  1;  the  coefficients  here  are  .051  and  .104.  Note  also  that  the 
coefficients  on income  are roughly  double  for  families  with a composition 
change,  reinforcing the  view  that  income  changes  are  correlated  with 
preference  shocks,  in this case induced by  household  composition  changes. 
I also  regressed  consumption  growth on  net number  of new people  added to 
the  household,  (panel  VIII)  as  a  test  of the  power  of  the  technique  to 
uncover  a coefficient  that ought  to be positive  and  large  in the  enorrous 
measurement  error  of this consumption  variable.  Consumption  growth  increases 
by 16.10 percentage  points  for  every added person,  with a  t-stat of 18;  the 
test  has a p-value  of an  impressive  1.06 x 
Concluding  Remarks 
The central  point  of this paper  is a  technique  for  testing  consumption 
insurance,  and  for measuring  which  shocks are  and aren't  insured,  based  on 
the  proposition  that  measured  consumption  growth  rates  ought  to  be 
independent  of  variables  that  are exogenous  to the consumers. 
Many  of  the  variables  yielded  mixed  results:  the  coefficients  were 
small, and the t-ststiscics  were around  2,  which does not allow  me to "fail 
to reject"  the theory, but are not very convincing  rejections  in sample  sizes 
of  2000-4000.  On the other  hand,  the loss of more than 100 days of work due 
to illness  snd  the loss  of s job are  important  right  hand variables,  whose 
14 associations  with consumption  growth  are both economically  and statistically 
significant.  Unless  these variables  are  significantly  correlated  with the 
error  terms  (sick people  might  lose their appetites,  and leisure might  enter 
nonseparably),  this  is  evidence  against  perfect  insurance.  Income  also 
yielded a  large  coefficient,  but  this  is  more  plausibly  correlated  with 
shocks to  preferences. 
The  empirical  results  in  this  study  can  be  extended  in a variety  of 
ways,  with richer  data sources.  The  most  obvious  extensions  are  to other 
variables  and more time periods.  Also,  we should expect  stronger  insurance 
among groups  that are geographically  close to each  other, work together,  or 
among relatives,  because  the informal arrangements  or altruistic  motives that 
proxy for  consumption  insurance  should be  stronger  for  these  groups,  and 
regressions  for subgroups  can be used  to test  this hypothesis. 
15 Table  1 
Variable Definitiona 
Consume: 
%  consumption  growth,  iOO*log(l983  consumption  /  1980  consumption) 
Consumption  — total food consumption  (food at home + foodstamps + meals  away 
from  home). 
Data rejected  if:  splitoff,  refused  an  interview,  composition  change, 
quality  of  match,  food  accuracy  codes,  farmers,  consumption  0  in either  80 
or 84. 
Imocons: 
Same  as  above, with  no rejection  for composition  change. 
Illness: 
Days  of work missed  by head in 81 82 and 83 because he/she  or someone  e].se 
was ill. 
Data only rejected for accuracy  codes. 
Strike: 
Days of  head's  work lost due to  strikes  in 81 82 and 83. 
Data only rejected  for accuracy codes. 
Move: 
Dummy  — 1  if head  moved in 81 82 or 83 because  of "response to outside events 
(involuntary  reasons):  H1J  coming  down,  being  evicted,  armed  services,  etc., 
health  reasons, divorce,  retiring because of  health," 
Loatiob: 
Dummy  variable.  Lostjob — 1  if head  was  employed  in 1980,  lost job in 81 82 
or 83,  was unemployed,  and gave  reason  1) "Company folded/changed  handa/iroved 
out of town; employer died/went  out of  business",  2) "Strike; lockout",  or 3) 
"Laid off; fired".  Losrjob — 0  if head  was employed in  1980,  stayed  eop1oved 
or lost job  for  other  reasons  (including  quit)  .  Data  rejected  if head not 
employed  in 1980. 
Wkslook: 
Total weeks  spent  looking for work in 81 82 and 83 if Lostjob  1. 
Movin: 
Number  of movers  in  -  movers  out of  household  in  81 82 and 83. 
Ysrow: 
%  total  income  growth  (1983+1982)/(1980+l98l).  Data rejected  if Income — 0 
in 83+82 or  80+81. 
16 Table  2 
Results 
I.  statistics  on  Consurnotion 
Consumption  growth with  Consumption  growth  with 
Composition  changes removed  Composition  changes not reroved 
Mean :  13.99  Mean:  12.33 
Std. Dev.  :  47.27  Std. Dcv.:  59.55 
Observations:  1741  Observations:  4629 
II. Consurnotion  on  days of Illness: 
n  :  1738  n  :  4614 
n illness — 0  :  868  n illness — 0  :  1925 
n illness > 0  :  870  n illness > 0  :  2689 
n illness ￿  100  :  99  n illness  100  :  333 
Consume — 15.109  .048 Illness  Impcons — 14.090 -  .056  Illness 
se.  :  1.222  .020  s.c.:  .895  .015 
t-stat:  -2.360  t-stat:  .-3.738 
Consume —  14.123 -  .178  Illness > 0  Irnpcons  — 12.162 + .703  Illness 
se:  1.605  2.268  dummy  s.c.:  1.357  1.778  > 0 
t-stat:  - .078  t-stat:  .396  dummy 
Consume  —  14.828 -14.22  Illness ￿  100  Irnpcons  — 13.367 
-  11.27  Illness 
se:  1.605  4.93  dummy  se,:  0.908  3.42  100 
t-stac:  -2.89  c-stat:  -3.29  -dummy 
Cross  tab: 
Observed  Expected  Observed  Expected 
c￿O  c>0  cO c>O  cO c>O  cO c>0 
I ￿  0  310  558  297  571  I ￿  0  740  1185  722  1203 
1>0  285  585  298  572  1>0  990  1699  1008  1681 
x2: 1.686  p-value:  43.04%  y2:  1.264  p-value:  53.16% 
17 (Table 2, contd) 
iLI. Consumotion  Lostiob: 
n  1173  n  3373 
n lostjob  — 0  :  1097  n lostjob — 0  :  3082 
n lostjob  — 1  :  76  n lostjob —  1  :  291 
Consume — 14.475 
-  24.025 Lostjob  Impcons — 13.964  -  26.741 Lostjob 
se.:  1.234  4.849  s.e.  :  1.006  3.435 
t-stat:  -  4.954  t-stat: 
-  7.808 
C  to  s  s  tab 
Observed  Expected  Observed  Expected 
cO c>0  c0 c>0  c0 c>0  cO c>0 
lj —0  356  741  371  726  lj —0 1090  1992  1149  1933 
lj — 1  41  35  26  50  lj — 1  167  124  108  183 
x2:  14.67  p-value:  0.065%  x2:  55.16  p-value:  1.O5E-10 
IV.  Consumption  on  Wkslook: 
1171  n  :  3362 
n wkslook  —  0  :  1153  n wkslook — 0  :  3316 
n wkslook  >  0  :  18  n wkslook > 0  :  46 
mean,  > 0  :  22.56  mean,  > 0  :  29.52 
Consume  13.149  -  0.341  Wkslook  Impcons —  12.009 -  0.728  'ksiook 
se.:  1.207  0.311  se.  :  .978  0.190425 
t-stat: 
-  1.095  t-stat: 
-  3.827 
Consume  13.117  -  5.645  Vkslook  Impcons  12.009  -  15.915 W'zs1ook 
s.e. :  1.212  9.778  dummy  se.  :  .978  8.359  dummy 
t-stat: 
-  0.577  t-stat: 
-  1.904 
Cross  tab: 
Observed  Expected  Observed  Expected 
cO c>O  cO c>O  c0 c>O  c￿O  c>O 
wl —0  390  763  390  763  wl  0  1224  2092  1231  2085 
wl > 0  6  12  6  12  wl  >0  24  22  17  29 
x2: 0.002  p-value:  99.90%  x2:  4.53  p-value:  10.40% 
18 (Table 2,  cont'd) 
3L  Consumption  on  strike 
n  :  1741 
n strike — 0  1705 
n strike > 0  :  36 
Consume — 14125  -  0214  Strike 
se.:  1.138  0.172 
t-stat:  1.243 
Consume — 14.184 -  9.515  Strike 
se.:  1.145  7.960  dummy  t-stat: 
-  1.195 
C  ro  a  a  tab 
Observed  Expected 
c￿0  c>0  c>0 
s —  0  582  1123  584  1121 
s>0  14  22  12  24 
x2: 0.354  p-value:  83.78% 
VI.  Consumption  on  Involuntary  Move: 
n  1741 
n moved — 0  :  1692 
n moved — 1  :  49 
Consume — 13.548 + 15.588  Moved 
s.c.:  1.148  6.841 
t-stat:  2.279 
Cross  tab: 
Observed  Expected 
cO c>O  cO c>O 
m — 0  582  1110  579  1113 
rn—i  14  35  17  32 
0.718  p-value:  69.84% 
19 
n  :  4629 
n strike — 0  :  4506 
n strike > 0  :  123 
Impcons — 12.567 
-  0.047  Strike 
s.c.:  0.880  0.130 
t-stat: 
-  0.365 
Impcons — 12.724 -  7.154  Strike 
se.  .837  5.441  dummy  t-stat: 
-  1.315 
Observed  Expected 
c￿0  c>O  c>O 
s  — 0  1689  2817  1691  2815 
s  > 0  48  75  46  77 
x2:  0.121  p-value:  94.12% 
n  :  4629 
n moved  — 0  :  4294 
nmoved—i  :  335 
Impcons — 12.942 -  5.642  Moved 
s.c.:  .909  3.377 
t-stat:  -  1.671 
Observed  Expected 
cO c>O  cO c>O 
m — 0  1583  2711  1611  2683 
in  —  1  154  181  126  209 
x2:  10.99  p-value:  0.41% VII.  Consumotion  on  Income: 
(Table  2,  cont'd) 
n  4629 
n movin — 0  2790 
mean  .004 
std.  dev.  :  .978 
Impcons  12.474 + 16.101 Movin 
0.844  0.863 
t-stat:  18.662 
Observed  Expected 
c0 c>O 
20 
x2:  105.8  p-value:  1.06 E-21 % 
n  :  1065 
mean  3.59 
std. dcv.  :  66.92 
Consume  — 13.739 + 
s.c.:  1.413 




n  :  3156 
mean :  4.41 
std. dcv  :  72.55 
Impcons — 11.817 
s.c.:  1.063 




7.537 + 8.741 
2.717  3.179 
2.750 
Consume  — 
se.: 
t- stat: 
Cross  tab 
Observed 





t  - stat: 
Observed  Expected  c0  c>0  c0  c>O 
1.248 + 15.939  Ygrow 
1.912  2.299  dummy 
6.934 
Expected 
y  0  118  169  96  191  y  0  444  529  367  606 
y >0  240  538  262  516  y >1  746  1437  823  1360 
c￿O  c>0  cO c>O 
x2:  37.624  p-value:  6.8E-07  %  x2:  9.903  p-value:  0.707% 
VIII.  Consunotion  on  movers in  , movers 
(consume rejects 
composition  change) 





6.542 + 28.329 Movin 
0.967  2.103  dummy 
13.474 
cO  c>0 
ci  0  1508  2142  1370  2280 
ml  >  0  229  750  367  612 Fig.  1 
0  0 
d —300  —200  —100  0.  100  200  300 
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22 Footnotes 
1Monotone  concave  utility  also  implies  that  utility  growth  is monotone  in 
consumption  growth: 
fJ(1  c,  8,  -  - 1  and  f1'(.;c1,  8, u  -  >  0.  t  t+r  t  t  t+r  t 
This  condition  may be useful when using  long time  series of data.  It says 
that with  variation  in preference but no  preference  shocks, consumption  growth 
rates  should  all have the same sign,  if not the sane magnitude. 
thank Robert  Townsend  for pointing  this out 
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